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RETALIATION AND THE RULE OF
LAW IN TODAYS WORKPLACE
R. GEORGE WRIGHTt
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary aim of this Article is to justify revising and ex-
panding today's law of workplace retaliation. The argument empha-
sizes, in particular, the meaning and value of the rule of law, in a
broad sense, in workplace retaliation cases. As it turns out, based on
the rule of law and other values, the case law, on balance, under-pro-
tects employees against retaliation by both private and public employ-
ers. This holds in typical status-based civil rights and non-
discriminatory contexts1 and in the area of public employee freedom of
speech as well.2
Retaliation claims brought by employees against their employers
are a substantial and increasing component of the broad civil rights
docket.3 Specifically, retaliation claims brought under the statutes
administered by the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion nearly doubled between 1997 and 2009.4 Retaliation claims have
steadily increased as a percentage of all claims, over the same time
frame, from 22.6 percent to 36.0 percent.5 Yet there are reasonable
grounds to conclude that such claims are still, on balance, under
filed.6
More generally, claims of retaliation can be brought pursuant to a
variety of federal civil rights statutes against employers and non-em-
ployers alike. Such statutes include, prominently, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.7 Among other relevant federal statutes are
t Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law -
Indianapolis.
1. See discussion infra Part II(B).
2. See discussion infra Part III. Secondarily, our inquiry may shed light on the
admittedly vague idea of the rule of law itself. See discussion infra Part II(A) in
particular.
3. See Charge Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2009, US. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT Or-
PORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://wwwl.eeoc.gov/eeocstatistics/enforcement/charges.cfm
(last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See discussion infra Part II(B), in the context of Part II(A).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1991). See, e.g., Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528,
541 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting "a plaintiff may meet his burden of proof for a claim of
retaliation under Title VII by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) involve-
ment in protected activity opposing an unlawful employment practice, (2) an adverse
employment action, and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse
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Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,8 the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990,9 Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of
1972,10 Title 42 Section 1981 on racial discrimination in contracting,"
Title 42 Section 1982 on racial discrimination with regard to prop-
erty,12 and the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967.13 Retaliation claims, particularly against
an employer, are thus widely available, whether the potential remedy
is exclusively equitable or not. 14
Courts have also focused on possible underlying purposes for al-
lowing retaliation claims, whether such claims are expressly provided
for by a particular statute or not.15 In explaining the value of retalia-
tion claims against an employer, courts have pointed to several consid-
erations, some partly independent of the substantive focus of the
particular civil rights or anti-discrimination statute in question. The
Supreme Court explained:
Thus in the context of Title VII, but with broader applicabil-
ity, the Supreme Court of the United States has distin-
guished the underlying substantive anti-discrimination aim
from that of the anti-retaliation provision in the following
terms: The antidiscrimination provision seeks a workplace
where individuals are not discriminated against because of
action") (citation omitted). See also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S.
53, 67-68 (2006) (providing a somewhat broader approach to these requirements).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). See, e.g., Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Pub. Schools Bd. of
Educ., 595 F.3d 1126, 1132-33 (10th Cir. 2010).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990). See Reinhardt, 595 F.3d at 1131 (explicitly applying
similar standards for retaliation claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans
With Disabilities Act). But cf Alvarado v. Cajun Operating Co., 588 F.3d 1261, 1270
(9th Cir. 2009) (ADA retaliation claims, like certain other statutory claims, are eligible
only for equitable relief, and not for compensatory or punitive damages) (citation omit-
ted). For further discussion of third-party retaliation claims against an employer under
both the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA, see Barker v. Riverside County
Office of Education, 584 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2009).
10. 20 U.S.C §§ 1681-88 (2006). See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S.
167, 173-76 (2005); see also CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1958
(2008).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991). See CBOCS West Inc., 128 S. Ct. at 1954-55.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1990). See CBOCS West Inc., 128 S. Ct at 1955 (citing Jack-
son, 544 U.S. at 176; Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969)).
See also Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1936 (2008).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 633a (2006). See Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1936-37. This statu-
tory area is among those in which a cause of action for retaliation has been judicially
inferred, rather than unequivocally created by an explicit statutory textual provision.
See id. For discussion of retaliation claims under statutes administered by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, see the persuasive, but not necessarily binding,
EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, SECTION 8: RETALIATION, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
retal.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2010). On the persuasive status of the EEOC Compli-
ance Manual in general, see Alvarado, 588 F.3d at 1270 n.7.
14. See the broad discussion in Alvarado, 588 F.3d at 1264-70.
15. For discussion, see, e.g., Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1936-37.
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their racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based status . . .. The
anti-retaliation provision seeks to secure that primary objec-
tive by preventing an employer from interfering (through re-
taliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance
enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees.' 6
The United States Supreme Court reformulated the basic purpose
of the anti-retaliation provision as that of "[mlaintaining unfettered
access to statutory remedial mechanisms,"' 7 and "to ensure that em-
ployees are 'completely free from coercion against reporting' unlawful
practices."' 8 More concretely, the Court has also observed that if "an
employee who reported discrimination in answering an employer's
questions could be penalized with no remedy, prudent employees
would have a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII offenses
against themselves or against others."' 9
This Article has no objection to thinking of anti-retaliation provi-
sions in civil rights and other statutes as indirectly promoting the par-
ticular substantive non-discrimination aims of the statute in question.
This Article's major thesis, however, is that anti-retaliation provi-
sions, whether express or judicially inferred, often reflect an impor-
tant additional value. This Article refers to this broad, fundamental,
and unavoidably hazily expressed value as the "integrity of the rule of
law."
In this context, the idea of the integrity of the rule of law applies
to both private and public employers when any official formal or infor-
mal mechanism or channel authorizes, or requires, an employee to an-
swer questions in good faith or to present the employee's thoughts on
any matter implicating a protected civil right. The official mechanism
may be as formal and as generally available as grand jury, trial, or
legislative testimony; discovery; or administrative proceedings. Or,
the official mechanism may be as informal as authorized channels for
internally investigating, reporting, or discussing matters related to
possible civil rights violations.
In such cases, the integrity of the rule of law value requires re-
straint, openness, consistency, and responsibility, particularly on the
part of the employer. There must be fidelity and respect for the sus-
16. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 63.
17. Id. at 64 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)) (adding,
in consequence, that "the anti-retaliation provision, unlike the substantive provision, is
not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of
employment").
18. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 67 (quoting NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121-22
(1972)). For discussion, see The Supreme Court, 2005 Term Leading Cases: Standard
For Retaliatory Conduct, 120 HARv. L. REV. 312, 313 (2006) (referring in connection
with Burlington Northern to "reducing deterrents to employee claims").
19. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 129 S. Ct. 846, 852 (2009).
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tained operation and integrity of the channels in question. This is
true whether those channels are largely independent of the employer's
own commitments, as in the case of most legal or administrative hear-
ings, or are largely internally designated channels for the good faith
discussion of matters such as sexual harassment.
This Article's main thesis is that properly providing for retaliation
claims, under any appropriate civil rights-oriented or other anti-dis-
crimination statute or constitutional provision, promotes the integrity
of the rule of law as described herein.20 This, in itself, is an impor-
tant, and in fact fundamental, value. And in general, any employer
retaliation or threat of retaliation, whatever its nature and severity
(or lack thereof), amounts to an attack on that integrity.
But even more crucially, from the standpoint of the immediate
parties, a proper focus on the integrity of the rule of law provides a
better general perspective on retaliation cases. In particular, focusing
on the rule of law's integrity exhibits how anti-retaliation values are
being unjustifiably under-enforced in both private21 and public22 em-
ployer cases. These cases include not only what is thought of as typi-
cal status-based civil rights and anti-discrimination cases,23 but
public employee freedom of speech cases as well.24 The integrity of
the rule of law will often require an appropriate judicial response to
any act or threat of intentional retaliation, regardless of whether the
employee suffered material harm from, should have resisted, or did
resist any threatened or actual retaliation however apparently mini-
mal that retaliation might have been. 25
II. RULE OF LAW INTEGRITY AND THE PRIVATE EMPLOYER
CASES
A. THE IDEA OF THE RULE OF LAW
It is not immediately easy to work with the idea of the rule of law.
The idea in general lacks clarity, 26 perhaps even internal consis-
tency. 27 Some formulations of the idea are too narrow for this Arti-
cle's purposes, focusing merely on formal laws publicly made and
20. See discussion infra Parts II(A), II(B), III.
21. See discussion infra Part II(B).
22. See discussion infra Part III.
23. See discussion infra Part II(B).
24. See discussion infra Part III.
25. See discussion infra Parts II(A), II(B), III.
26. See BRim Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAw: HisToRy, PoLrrics, THEORY 3
(2004); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1 (1997).
27. See Fallon, supra note 26, at 1.
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publicly administered by judicial bodies. 28 Some classic formulations
elaborate on more dimensions of the rule of law than are realistically
required for this Article's purposes.29
Perhaps no standard treatment of the rule of law, of the sort typi-
cally focusing on constitutions, statutes, and their implementation
and interpretation by courts and other public officials, precisely fits
this Article's concern. This Article's context is that of private and pub-
lic employers and employees, various sorts of workplaces and dis-
putes, as well as various formal and informal means of investigating
and processing relevant claims.
But at least some flavor of the integrity of the rule of law value is
conveyed in the thoroughly familiar formula of the rule of law as dis-
tinguished from the rule of persons, or of men. This general idea re-
curs throughout the case law. 30 In particular, Professor Brian
Tamanaha has recently written of "the primacy of the rule of law as
distinct from the rule of persons"3 1 as important to the idea of the rule
of law.32
In itself, and as fairly adapted to private and public work place-
process contexts, this sense of the rule of law suggests that the integ-
rity of any officially recognized relevant process requires consistent
and meaningful employer respect for that process. Such respect cru-
28. See Tom BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAw 8, 37 (2010).
29. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 33-94 (rev. ed. 1969) (the eight princi-
ples of legality as encompassing operation through general norms; promulgation to
those bound by the law; general prospectivity of application; clarity as opposed to unin-
telligibility; mutual consistency and joint fulfillability of legal requirements; realistic
possibility of compliance by those bound; sufficient continuity in the law to allow for
general familiarity; and a general congruence between the law's formal norms and the
law's norms as actually practiced). For discussion, see, e.g., MATTHEw H. KRAMER, OB-
JECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF LAw 101-186 (2007). As appropriately interpreted, "Fuller's
theoretical framework compendiously summarizes all the essential properties of the
rule of law." Id. at 185. See also the classic discussion in A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF THE LAw OF THE CONSTITUTION part II, ch. IV (8th ed. 1915). See also the
contemporary treatments in N.E. SIMMONDs, LAw AS A MORAL IDEA (2007) and Jeremy
Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 55 (2008) ("[a] philosophy
of law is impoverished as a general theory if it pays no attention to the formalized proce-
dural aspects of courts and hearings or to more elementary features of natural justice
."). For judicial insight into something like an integrity of administrative process
value, see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 93, 94 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (em-
phasizing several practical benefits of a well-respected administrative adjudication
process).
30. See, e.g., Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 80 (2006); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep.
Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 293, 295 n.3 (1998) (Steven, J., dissenting): Franklin v. Gwinett
Cnty. Pub. Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965);
and the classic opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163
(1803).
31. TAMANAHA, supra note 26, at 140.
32. Professor Tamanaha actually detects three "clusters of meaning" of the rule of
law. Id. at 137. These clusters include, beyond the above, that the government is lim-
ited by law and that a rule-based formal legality exists. Id. at 139.
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cially requires refraining from imposing, somehow threatening, or
condoning any degree of retaliation for the good faith participation by
an employee, voluntarily or otherwise, in the processes in question. If
an employer establishes or recognizes such processes but later im-
poses or validates any degree of retaliation based on an employee's
good faith cooperation with such processes, the employer has hypocrit-
ically engaged in the civilized processing of disputes and potential dis-
putes. The employer thus has failed to appropriately respect rule of
law integrity values.
Merely for the sake of one concrete example of such a process,
consider the case of Weger v. City of Ladue33 discussing a police de-
partment sexual harassment policy. 3 4 Under the policy in question,
all employees were "required to report observed acts of harassment to
a supervisor and failure to do so [was] grounds for discipline."35 The
policy in question detailed "a comprehensive complaint procedure,"36
and concluded by prohibiting "retaliation against complainants and
those participating in complaint investigations."3 7
Particularly, though, when the employer makes the reporting of
observed harassment mandatory,38 and expressly forswears at least
some degrees or forms of retaliation,39 the employer makes an even
stronger representation that an employee need not, or even must not,
attempt a standard cost-benefit analysis in deciding whether to utilize
the officially authorized process.40 In this Article's view, any degree
or form of intentional retaliation amounts to a form of contempt for
the employees concerned and more generally for the rule of law's
integrity.
33. 500 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2007).
34. Weger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 715-17 (8th Cir. 2007).
35. Weger, 500 F.3d at 715.
36. Id. at 715.
37. Id.
38. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
40. It has been argued that "[diecisions about whether to challenge discrimination
rest on a careful balancing of the costs and benefits of doing so." Deborah L. Brake,
Retaliation, 90 Mium. L. REv. 18, 36 (2005). While some of the risks or costs of such
reporting may be quite accurately assessed by typical employees, others may not, or
perhaps cannot possibly be, under the state of the law. Even with legal counsel, it may
be almost entirely unclear, for example, whether there is a sufficient objectively reason-
able basis for an employee's claim of retaliation, or whether the employee has suffered a
sufficient material deprivation to bring a successful retaliation claim. See, e.g., Burling-
ton N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67-68 (2006). Potential complainants
may, for various entirely understandable reasons, delay in reporting harassment or
other discrimination, without realizing that such delay in reporting may be used
against them. See, e.g., Weger, 500 F.3d at 715. See also the employer's affirmative
defense established in Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)
and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806-07 (1998).
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Before these theses in the context of the case law are considered,
several clarifications should be offered. First, it should be recognized
that the idea of employer "retaliation" against an employee can be am-
biguous. This Article's main focus will be on employer retaliation in
the sense of actual or threatened punishment in connection with an
employee's involvement in some authorized process associated with an
underlying civil rights claim. The word "retaliation" can also refer to
when an employer punishes employee speech on any subject, spoken
outside of any official channel or process used for addressing underly-
ing civil rights-related grievances, such as when a government em-
ployer disciplines a public employee for speaking in any forum from a
viewpoint disfavored by the government employer. 41
This Article's narrow emphasis on the employer's alleged retalia-
tion for an employee participating in some sort of official process or
mechanism should also be clarified. This Article's concern for the in-
tegrity of the rule of law in this process-emphasizing sense leads, in
Title VII terms, to a focus mainly on what are called "participation"
claims as distinguished from "opposition" claims. 42 The basic idea
here is that an employee has many ways to oppose alleged discrimina-
tion other than by participating in some sort of official process, and
that participating in such a process need not involve opposing alleged
discrimination.43 This is, of course, not to deny the possibility that
"participation" claims and "opposition" claims can, in practical terms,
overlap. 44
41. This distinction is recognized and discussed by Judge Easterbrook in Fairley v.
Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 2009), a free speech case brought under Section
1983 and subject to Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), which nevertheless in-
volved alleged attempts to deter formal testimony. For a survey of free speech "retalia-
tion" claims, see, for example, Elizabeth Bohn, Put On Your Coat, A Chill Wind Blows:
Embracing the Expansion of the Adverse Employment Action Factor in Tenth Circuit
First Amendment Retaliation Claims, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 867 (2006).
42. For this statutory distinction, see Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78
Stat. 253, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a) (2006).
43. For one particular context, see Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nash-
ville, 129 S. Ct. 846, 852 (2009). Crawford held that the "opposition" clause of Title VII
extends to an employee's answering the employer's investigatory questions concerning a
complaint brought by a co-worker, where the employee in question did not take the
initiative with regard to her participation. Id.
44. For example, "participation" and "opposition" claims may overlap in a case like
Crawford. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852. See Megan E. Mowrey, Discriminatory Retalia-
tion: Title VII Protection for the Cooperating Employee, 29 PACE L. REv. 689, 691 (2009)
(arguing that Title VII protects workers in Crawford's position under both the "partici-
pation and "opposition" clauses). The relevant statutory language in question reads as
follows: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees .. . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter." Id. at 690 (quoting the statutory section cited supra note 42)
(emphasis added to highlight the distinction in question).
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Finally, it should be specifically emphasized that contrary to es-
tablished case law, the limits of what should be protected against em-
ployer retaliation should be set primarily by the employee's good faith
in the employee's underlying "participation," and not by the em-
ployee's judicially-determined objective reasonableness in so acting.
As the law stands, generally a retaliation plaintiff "must show that he
had a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying challenged ac-
tions of the employer violated the law."4 5 This involves an ultimately
unfortunate objective reasonableness element.
The law as it stands thus requires both good faith and the objec-
tive reasonableness of the employee's belief in the illegality, which is
presumably under some relevant civil rights statute, of the employer's
conduct.46 Of course, it is possible for an employer to retaliate against
employee testimony that does not, in the slightest, imply that the em-
ployer has engaged in illegal conduct, or that the employee believes
that the employer engaged in illegal conduct. However, this Article
will set such cases aside as an unnecessary complication.
The issue at this point is whether a good faith requirement should
have been supplemented with a reasonableness-of-belief test. And in
a sense, it is admittedly hard to reasonably argue against "reasonable-
ness." Nevertheless, in this context, realistically understood, the aim
of promoting respect for the integrity of the rule of law is likely better
served by omitting an objective reasonableness requirement of the em-
ployee's belief that the employer has relevantly violated the law.
This may seem odd, however, in that the Section 1983 qualified
immunity defense cases have a somewhat similar idea of requiring a
showing that the government defendants' belief in the legality of their
own conduct was objectively reasonable. 47 The qualified immunity de-
fense for government actors focuses on whether, at the time of their
actions, a reasonable person in the position of the government actor
defendant would or would not have known that his conduct, described
at a specific level, violated clearly established, if not technically con-
trolling, case law.4 8
The Harlow v. Fitzgerald49 objective reasonableness test for such
cases is indeed judicially quite familiar. In fact, since 1982, the Fitz-
gerald case has attracted a total of 57,876 West Keycite references as
45. Riscilli v. Gibson Guitar Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 558, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
46. Riscilli, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 565.
47. The central case in this regard is Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19
(1982). See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
48. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635 (1987).
49. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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of June 2, 2010.50 By contrast, the legendarily frequently cited case of
Chevron v. NRDC51 has been cited 56,569 times on the same metric. 52
One question is whether the enormous number of Fitzgerald citations,
confined to government defendants sued in their personal capacity,
necessarily means that the law is actually working well. Mountainous
stacks of case law applications might instead indicate lack of clarity in
an important area of the law.
And when courts and practitioners try to apply an objective rea-
sonableness test to a fast food worker's belief that the employer's con-
duct violates the intricate law of, say, sexual harassment, or age or
disability discrimination, the obvious risk of entirely losing any real-
istic sensitivity to the actors, their capacities, and the situation arises.
Private sector employees at various levels of literacy, language flu-
ency, age or experience, and cultural familiarity may be unfamiliar
with and have only a modest grasp, at best, on what violates, for in-
stance, a statute on disability discrimination. The potentially mis-
leading form of supervisor inquiries may even prompt or discourage
these employees' actions.53
To expect, for example, private fast food workers or most other
groups of workers to be able to apply the objective reasonableness test
for a half-dozen potentially relevant statutes departs dramatically
from common sense and arbitrarily burdens employees whose jobs are
possibly at stake. The law of retaliation should instead protect em-
ployees who speak in good faith, who do not willfully abuse a reporting
system or act with malice, or who repeatedly bring the same complaint
for the same alleged act. In any event, such a rule seems to most real-
istically and reasonably accommodate the various interests at stake,
including the public interest of employer respect for the integrity of
the rule of law.
B. PRIVATE EMPLOYER RETALIATION UNDER BURLINGTON NORTHERN
AND RELATED CASE LAW
The standards adopted by the Supreme Court of the United
States for retaliation claims under Title VII 5 4 are set forth largely in
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White.55 To simplify for
50. See the citing references under the Westlaw Keycite system to the Harlow case.
51. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
52. See the citing references under the Westlaw Keycite system to Chevron. Chev-
ron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Of course, Chev-
ron, decided two years after Fitzgerald, has been cited more frequently on a per-year
basis.
53. See, e.g., Riscili v. Gibson Guitar Corp., 605 F. Supp. 2d 558, 565-67 (2009).
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1991).
55. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
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this Article's purposes, Sheila White brought an underlying claim of
sex discrimination in employment and several allegedly causally re-
lated claims of prohibited retaliation.56 As found by the trial jury and
upheld by the Supreme Court, the specific forms of retaliation in-
volved were a particular reassignment to purportedly less desirable
work and a thirty-seven-day suspension without pay, where the sum
in question was only later recovered by White as back pay.5 7
The Supreme Court in Burlington Northern rejected the idea that
employer retaliation involving no cognizable harm to the victim, or
harm only below a certain threshold level, could be actionable as a
Title VII retaliation claim.58 The Court specified that a plaintiff
claiming retaliation "must show that a reasonable employee would
have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this
context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination."59
The Court then explained that the point of the "materiality" re-
quirement was to distinguish and screen out "trivial" from "signifi-
cant" harms.60 Title VII, the Court emphasized, did not attempt to
promulgate "a general civility code for the American workplace."61
Additionally, the point of the "reasonable" employee standard was to
implement the Court's belief that "the ... standard for judging harm
must be objective."62 The value of an objective standard, in turn, was
said to lie in its relative ease of judicial administrability,63 and its
56. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 58-59 (2006).
57. See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 67-68.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). There may
appear to be some internal tension in the Court's formulation, which here employs both
the stronger "would" and the weaker "might." But there is technically no necessary
inconsistency here. The idea may be that a reasonable worker would (definitely) have
found that, under the circumstances, he or she might (not would) have been deterred or
dissuaded from complaining (perhaps retroactively). The logic, though a bit delicate,
may be akin to someone's confidently saying that he or she definitely would, under the
circumstances, have found that the threat might, or might well, have had a real deter-
rent effect. In general, we can sometimes say for certain that we would be uncertain
under specified circumstances. Or so one could interpret the Court's "materially ad-
verse" effect standard.
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)).
Related, a hostile environment sufficient to amount to discrimination in the terms and
conditions of employment must be more substantial than a mere breach of a "general
civility code." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998). See also
Courtney J. Anderson DaCosta, Stitching Together the Patchwork: Burlington North-
ern's Lessons for State Whistleblower Law, 96 GEO. L. J. 951, 966-67 (2008). For a
broader discussion, see B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TuL. L. REv. 439, 480-81 (2008);
Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 355 n.5 (4th Cir. 2006) (King, J., dissenting).
62. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68.
63. See id. at 68. But see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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avoidance of uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that may result
from judicial inquiries into "unusual subjective feelings."64
On the other hand, the Court's emphasis on objectivity6 5 was
complicated by a concern for particularity, circumstances, and specific
context.66 The reasonableness standard was then further character-
ized-subjectivized, actually-as focusing on "the perspective of a rea-
sonable person in the plaintiffs position."67 The Court's concern thus
extended to an act's "real social impact,"68 given the subtleties of cir-
cumstances, expectations, and actual, testified-to workplace relation-
ships. 69 Quite realistically, the Court observed, or conceded, that a
particular work schedule change might be inconsequential to many
workers, but can be construed as retaliatory, inconvenient, expensive,
punitive, and an effective deterrent-retroactively or prospectively-
to a parent with substantial child-care responsibilities.70
Taken together, the Burlington Northern test for a material ad-
verse harm in alleged retaliation cases sought to somehow combine, in
some largely unclarified way, the supposed virtues of an objective
standard-low cost and avoidance of unduly broad anti-retaliation
rules that might reward employee hypersensitivity-with a more
costly and judicially demanding individualized, testimony-based in-
quiry into particular workplace circumstances, for the sake of
sensitivity.
Even as best and most generously interpreted, however, the Bur-
lington Northern "material adversity" standard for Title VII retalia-
tion claims does not appropriately accommodate the integrity of the
rule of law value."1 Nor is the test likely, in practice, to prove suffi-
ciently sensitive to the often unprovable, but quite genuine, risks and
costs often faced by vulnerable workers considering retaliation claims.
Hence, again, this Article's recommended focus is on good faith, rather
64. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68-69.
65. See id. at 69.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 69-70 (emphasis added).
68. See id. at 69.
69. See id.
70. See id. Work schedule changes of as little as a half hour might also sabotage a
disfavored employee's chances of taking a class or pursuing a degree. Greater or lesser
numbers of assigned work hours can of course also be significant. See generally JULIET
B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE (1993).
For criticism of Burlington Northern's consideration of significant realistic differences
among employee circumstances, on grounds of a loss of uniformity in the law, undue
breadth, unpredictability, arbitrariness, and unnecessary cost, see Julia S. Lee, Walk-
ing On Eggshells: The Effect of the United States Supreme Court's Ruling in Burlington
Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 683, 697-99 (2008); Yvette K.
Schultz, Runaway Train: The Retaliation Scene After Burlington Northern v. White, 68
LA. L. REV. 1025, 1026-27 (2008).
71. See discussion supra Part II(A).
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than on the hopeless and entirely unrealistic quest for objectivity, in
limiting retaliation claims. Additionally, this Article's focus is on
some legal response to any intended retaliation of any degree, rather
than seeking to distinguish, in a federal courthouse, between materi-
ally adverse consequences of retaliation and the consequences of retal-
iation that the court does not recognize at all or fails to recognize as
being materially adverse.
It is useful to remember that the working lives and circumstances
of those who rule, administratively or judicially, on retaliation claims
tend to differ from those of the workers who file the retaliation com-
plaints. At an even greater distance are those workers who are intimi-
dated from or otherwise unwilling to file any such complaint,
whatever its validity. Under any labor market conditions, the circum-
stances of work can vary enormously, along dimensions that may not
even be recognized.
By way of illustrating this point, consider one supermarket box
boy quoted by noted author Studs Terkel: "You were supposed to get a
ten-minute break every two hours. I lived for that break. You'd go
outside, take your shoes off, and be human again. You had to request
it. And when you took it, they'd make you feel guilty."7 2 Worker frus-
trations more generally can be internalized,73 or re-directed against
lower status co-workers. 74 Legal rules can be undermined in their ef-
fectiveness by workplace rules justified on independent grounds.75
Punishments can come in innumerable degrees of severity, informal-
ity, cumulativeness, indirectness, and duration. 76 Rules solemnly
adopted by the Supreme Court can be variously bypassed, minimized,
or ignored at the expense of unusually vulnerable workers.77 Case
law principles and tests should modestly seek to take some account of
the differences in working worlds between say, Article 11178 judges,
and more typical workers in inhospitable labor markets.
The case law illustrates how the cumulative effect of even micro-
aggressive employer retaliations can be demoralizing to a reasonable
72. STuDs TERKEL, WORKING: PEOPLE TAL ABour WHAT THEY Do ALL DAY AND
How THEY FEEL ABouT WHAT THEY Do 281 (2004 ed. 1972).
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. It has been observed, for example, that "[r]ules against 'gossip,' or even 'talk-
ing,' make it harder to air your grievances to peers." BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND
DnWED: ON (Nor) GETrING BY IN AMERICA 209 (2008 ed. 2001).
76. See id.
77. See id. at 207 (noting that "it is illegal to punish people for revealing their
wages to one another, but [that] the practice is likely to persist until rooted out by law-
suits, company by company"). See also DAVID K SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INvIsI-
BLE IN AMERICA 137 (2004) ("[slome firms even reject people who had sued former
employers for racial discrimination or sexual harassment").
78. U.S. CONST. art. III.
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employee, especially given the crucially social nature of many work-
places and many forms of work. Each such element of retaliation,
though, can always be otherwise justified on some pretext, or dis-
missed as trivial rather than materially adverse, even in combina-
tion.79 A series of petty, vaguely demeaning, and isolating
impositions on workers with any underlying grievances can send a
clear and unmistakable message to the aggrieved workers and their
potential allies, even if not to a reviewing court,80 and even if the un-
derlying grievances are themselves processed fairly.
As well, courts should be more alert to the retaliatory intent and
impact of what might be called workplace "collective punishments."
In some cases, the employer may retaliate by burdening or sanction-
ing many or all employees in the same way, thus blurring the retalia-
tory issues of intent and causation.8 1 The problem is that many
"innocent" employees may blame the newly imposed burdens and
petty inconveniences on the complaining employees, or on their fellow
employees, along with the employer.
Relatedly, an employer may retaliate not directly against any
complaining worker, but against the complaining worker's allies,
friends, or relatives, some of who may not have engaged in any statu-
torily protected activity.82 The retaliatory point and impact, however,
could still be clear to the affected parties, if not also to a reviewing
court.
Given this Article's emphasis on the integrity of the rule of law
value, the courts should be willing to address any form and degree of
retaliation in which the employee, having the burden of proof, can
show the employer's intent to retaliate and sufficient evidence of cau-
sation.83 On a standard any more demanding, courts undermine rule
of law values and run a serious risk of misunderstanding the social
interactive dynamics of many workplaces-underestimating the sub-
tle, but actually quite significant, effects of what may strike a review-
ing court as relatively superficial, avoidable, or trivial.84
79. See, e.g., Weger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 716-17 (8th Cir. 2007).
80. See Weger, 500 F.3d at 726-27 (seeking to sort out "significant from trivial
harms").
81. See id. at 726.
82. See, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011) (expanding
the scope of protected emloyees to include a fiance).
83. See, e.g., Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 519 (6th Cir. 2009) (a com-
plaint of employer retaliation that relies on guesswork, speculation, subjective belief, or
unsubstantiated intuition as insufficient, on the causation issue, to withstand the em-
ployer's motion for summary judgment) (citation omitted).
84. See, for example, the retaliation standard set forth in the Rehabilitation Act
case of Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Pub. Schools, 595 F.3d 1126, 1133 (10th Cir. 2010)
(seeking to distinguish in practice, under a "material adversity" standard, alleged retal-
iatory acts carrying "a significant risk of humiliation, damage to reputation, and a con-
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Even if the rule of law integrity concerns are set aside, the law as
it stands under-recognizes the extent and degree to which workers,
and young workers in particular, value the often subtle social dimen-
sions of work, including a subjective sense of collegiality, connectivity,
mutual respect, informality, open communication, and congeniality in
the workplace.85 Workers often desire employers or supervisors not
undermine these social dimensions of work. But workers certainly
also can have a strong reluctance to jeopardize these social dimensions
of work by filing a retaliation claim, or otherwise rocking the prover-
bial boat, even in tight labor markets, given the possible consequences
noted above.86
III. THE RULE OF LAW IN PUBLIC EMPLOYER FREE
SPEECH CASES: GARCETTI AS TRAVESTY
Commonly, the many Garcetti v. Ceballos87 public employee free
speech cases do not involve the form of retaliation on which this Arti-
cle has concentrated above. Typically, the plaintiffs in such cases do
not allege that they were punished for utilizing some officially estab-
lished channel or mechanism to raise or otherwise address some
broadly civil-rights-oriented employment grievance. The disfavored
speech could take any subject and could occur in any medium. The
Garcetti case itself involved a government-employed deputy district
attorney who alleged he was sanctioned for officially disfavored speech
when he recommended a criminal case of alleged government miscon-
duct be dismissed in a case disposition memorandum. 88
comitant harm to future employment prospects" from "a mere inconvenience or an
alteration of job responsibilities") (citation omitted). We might have more confidence in
the theory of this distinction if alteration of job responsibilities were not so frequently
vulnerable to abuse as a method of constraint, penalty, or humiliation.
85. See, e.g., Lauren Leader-Chivee, et al., Networking the Way to Success, ENTRE-
PRENEUR, June 6, 2010, http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/200784523.
html (last visited March 13, 2011); Richard J. Harmer & Bruce N. Findlay, The Effect of
Workplace Relationships on Employee Job Satisfaction For 25-33 Year Olds (SWINBURNE








86. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text. It is also possible that a co-
worker might resent even a justified claim of retaliation, independent of any likely reac-
tion by the employer. But this kind of case may be hard to sort out from those in which
other employees fear that even a legitimate retaliation complaint may make things
harder-more tedious, more formal, more structured and rule-bound-for others.
87. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
88. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413-16 (2006).
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At the most general level, a public employee bringing a free
speech claim against a government employer must show at a mini-
mum that the speech was constitutionally protected, that "adverse
employment action" was taken, and that the protected speech was a
substantial or motivating factor underlying the adverse reaction. 9
The government employer then has the opportunity to show that the
adverse employment action would have been taken against the em-
ployee, even in the absence of the protected speech.90
This broad formulation, however, thus far leaves open the ques-
tion of when and on what theory the underlying public employee
speech is constitutionally protected. The Garcetti case is at this point
decisive. Garcetti reaffirmed previous cases that had required that in
order to be protected, the speech in question must have been on a sub-
ject matter of public interest and concern.9 ' In the case at issue, the
interests of the public employee in speaking out on that matter of pub-
lic interest outweighed the government's interests as an employer in
the workplace efficiency and operational functioning of the govern-
ment agency.92
What the Supreme Court of the United States in Garcetti cru-
cially clarified, if not simply added, was a preliminary requirement.
Specifically, the government employee must show that her speech was
not uttered pursuant to or in the course and scope of her actual gov-
ernment job responsibilities or duties. 93 Vitally, the Court held that
"when public employees make statements pursuant to their official
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amend-
ment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communi-
cations from employer discipline."94
Public employee speech conveyed as a matter of one's genuine em-
ployment responsibilities is thus constitutionally unprotected from
governmental retaliatory discipline. This is true regardless of the
gravity, significance, insider perspective, or indispensability to any
meaningful public discussion of a crucial public issue, and regardless
of the degree to which the interests of the employee in speaking, or of
89. See Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2007) (developing Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ, v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
90. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287; Chavez-Rodriguez v. City of Santa Fe, 596
F.3d 708, 713 (10th Cir. 2010).
91. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch.
Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
92. See id. at 417 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568); see also Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987).




the public in hearing the speech in question, might outweigh the inter-
est in governmental workplace effectiveness.95
For this Article's purposes, the most crucial question is thus
whether the public employee "speaks as a citizen rather than pursu-
ant to his official duties."96 The focus in such cases is said to not be
merely on the formal, official duties of an employee as expressed in a
formal written job description or manual, but on "the employer's real
rules and expectations . . . ."97 As Judge Michael McConnell ex-
pressed the limitation, "employee speech that is 'pursuant' to the [pub-
lic] employee's professional duties is not accorded First Amendment
protection under Garcetti."98
Not surprisingly, Garcetti has created uncertainties, from its pos-
sible applicability to cases involving academic freedom,99 to the cur-
rent circuit split over whether the complainant's speech falling or not
falling within her job responsibilities is a pure question of law for the
courts or a mixed question of law and fact.100
But the immediate problem, from this Article's perspective, is
that Garcetti's distinction between speaking as a public employee and
speaking as a citizen, with free speech protection even potentially
available only in the latter cases, creates the possibility not only for
arbitrariness, but also for sheer travesty. The Garcetti test, in this
respect, will often fail to properly consider constitutionally protecting
responsible public employee speech from obvious retaliation by the
employer, where such protection would clearly promote important rule
of law values.
It is necessary to emphasize that this Article's concern is not pri-
marily with the outcome itself in the many Garcetti-type cases. The
Garcetti cases, as this Article noted,' 0 involved multiple steps and
requirements. For example, a government employee alleging retalia-
tion based on speech must show a causal link between the speech in
95. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
96. Chavez-Rodriguez, 596 F.3d at 713.
97. See Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 2009) (describing Garcetti
as holding that "the first amendment does not protect statements made as a part of
one's job."); Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424-25.
98. Thomas v. City of Blanchard, 548 F.3d 1317, 1323 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420-21) (emphasis added). For merely one example of the develop-
ing law review literature, see, e.g., Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Cate-
gorical Balancing and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV.
561, 561-62 (2008).
99. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425 (holding open the academic freedom issue); id. at
427, 428-29 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting the possible adverse effects on academic free-
dom of the majority approach).
100. See, e.g., Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist., 546 F.3d 1121, 1127-29 (9th Cir.
2008) (documenting the circuit split on this issue).
101. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
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question and the retaliation. 102 As well, government employee speech
that does not address a matter of public interest and concern is also
generally not constitutionally protected. 03 The government may also
restrict public employee speech that cannot be justified in light of its
adverse effects on the government workplace's efficiency.104 All of
these restrictions seem defensible, if not without their problems.' 05
This Article's concern is instead with ignoring or bypassing all of
the above considerations, based on the doubtful categorical distinction
between speech uttered within, or not within, the scope of one's actual
government work responsibilities. 06 This inquiry may indeed lead to
oddly counterintuitive results, but this Article's concern is primarily
with the indifference to rule of law values that government retaliation
against the government employee-speaker in such cases can
display.107
Consider, merely as examples, several recent federal appellate
cases, which raised this threshold issue in Garcetti. In Weintraub v.
Board of Education of the City School District of New York,' 08 a public
school teacher was terminated, allegedly for filing a union grievance
with regard to a student throwing books at the teacher in class on two
occasions, with no apparent discipline against the student allegedly
being taken.109 Without reaching any further issue, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that David Weintraub,
"by filing a grievance with his union to complain about his supervisor's
failure to discipline a child in his classroom, was speaking pursuant to
102. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., R. George Wright, Speech On Matters of Public Interest and Concern,
37 DEPAUL L. REV. 27 (1987).
106. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
107. Non-employment cases in which government retaliation is excused on the
grounds that retaliation would not deter a "person of ordinary firmness" from exercising
some related constitutional right should also give us concern. However "ordinary firm-
ness" is measured in non-employment cases, the broader and subtler question of how to
take into account the particular circumstances of such a hypothetical plaintiff must still
somehow be answered. Nor is non-employment related retaliation for otherwise protec-
tion-worthy speech any less contemptuous of rule of law values because a court deems
such intended retaliation to be of only minimal severity. For discussion in a variety of
contexts, see, for example, Couch v. Bd. of Tr. of Mem'1 Hosp. of Carbon Cnty., 587 F.3d
1223 (10th Cir. 2009); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554 (9th Cir. 2009); Bridges v. Gil-
bert, 557 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2009); Holman v. City of York, 564 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2009);
Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2009).
108. 593 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2009).
109. See Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of New York, 593 F.3d 196,
198-99 (2d Cir. 2010).
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his official duties and thus not as a citizen.""10 Weintraub's speech
was for that reason alone constitutionally unprotected."'
Again, this is not a matter of arguing over the result in the case.
There might have been issues in Weintraub of causation,112 or of
whether the plaintiffs speech addressed a matter of public concern,113
or of interest balancing.114 But to hold the public employee's speech
was constitutionally unprotected from retaliation, on the grounds sim-
ply that it was uttered through channels the retaliating government
employer had officially authorized and that were not available to ordi-
nary citizens, is distinctly odd.
It may be assumed that filing such a union grievance is indeed a
part of one's job, within one's realistic job description, or within the
scope of one's employment, as authoritatively determined or at least
recognized by the government employer. But if so, that fact makes
any retaliation for good faith speech through those authorized chan-
nels more, and not less, objectionable. This would hold whether or not
the employer required any such speech, initially, and then penalized
the employee. To officially endorse, and then penalize, the assumedly
appropriate and good faith use of a particular speech channel is to
that extent contrary to the integrity of the rule of law."15
The implications of Garcetti would be objectionable even if cases
generally like Weintraub were rare. But they are not." 6 Garcetti, in
110. Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 201.
111. See id. Judge Calabresi, dissenting in id. at 205, would have sought to nar-
rowly construe the scope of the Garcetti holding. See also McLaughlin v. Pezzolla, No.
06-CV-0376, 2010 WL 826952 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2010) (seeking to distinguish Wein-
traub based on the presumed greater breadth and scope of the employee allegations in
McLaughlin).
112. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
115. See generally FULLER, supra note 29, at 33-94.
116. See, e.g., Boyce v. Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (social
worker's speech retaliation claim, based on personal and public interest concerns over
size of case load, as expressed through office e-mails and "Assignment Despite Objec-
tion" forms provided by union to avoid insubordination, id. at 1337, must fail as speech
of employees rather than as citizens); Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696 (9th
Cir. 2009) (police officers' investigation, as supervised by county attorney, of allegedly
improper conduct by fellow officers, as resulting in speech that was in furtherance of
official duties and for that reason unprotected under Garcetti). But cf Reilly v. City of
Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008) (police officers' truthful court testimony re-
garding alleged criminal wrongdoing within police department held to be speech as a
citizen rather than speech pursuant to official police duties). Along the general lines of
Boyce, supra, and Huppert, supra, see Huth v. Haslun, 598 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2010) (public
employee plaintiff did not engage in citizen speech protectable against retaliation in
discussing her subordinate's comments about their co-workers in plaintiffs meeting
with supervisors); Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555 (7th Cir. 2010) (police officer's speech
was not protected against retaliation when officer complained directly and through
union grievance process about allegedly unsafe lead levels at a state police firing range
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this respect, accommodates government employer hypocrisy in many
cases in which the employer seeks to penalize or deter good faith, job-
generated employee speech through officially authorized or even re-
quired channels. In such cases, questions of the weight of the inter-
ests involved are, oddly, not even considered.117
IV. CONCLUSION
The result of this Article's consideration of employer retaliation
under non-discrimination statutes and in government employee
speech cases under Garcetti v. Ceballos"s is that the rules tend, on
balance, to under-protect workers from unjustified employer retalia-
tion for good faith use of authorized channels of communication. In
some cases, this may be a matter of a court's, perhaps understandable,
insensitivity to the real weight in context of explicit or implicit threats
of retaliation. But the very idea of any penalty being imposed on the
good faith use of an officially authorized or required channel of com-
munication is, more fundamentally, an affront to the basic norms of
the integrity of the rule of law.
In some cases, of course, one sort or another type of
"whistleblower" protection or related labor statute may be available at
the state" 9 or federall 20 level to assist some victims of employer re-
taliation for the use of authorized channels of communication.121 The
obvious problem with such whistleblower and labor code provisions,
however, is their inevitably patchwork-like, incomplete, piecemeal,
that was then closed for environmental remediation); Winder v. Erste, 566 F.3d 209
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (D.C. school employee's speech to departmental officials, to a judicially
appointed Special Master, in testimony before the D.C. City Council, and also to the
D.C. Inspector General was all within the scope of his official responsibilities and thus
unprotected from retaliation). See also Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1091-92
(7th Cir. 2008) (citing cases). But cf Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2007)
(while some speech instances were unprotected against retaliation, "[bleing deposed in a
[job-related] civil suit pursuant to subpoena was unquestionably not one of [plaintiffs]
job duties because it was not part of what he was employed to do").
117. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
118. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
119. For a survey of such state-level statutes, see the NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWERS
CENTER website materials, http://www.whistleblowers.org/index (last visited Dec. 30,
2010).
120. For a collection of relevant statutory provisions at the federal level, see the
citations and commentary at THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR http://
www.dol.gov/compliance/guide/whistle.htm (last visited June 10, 2010). For a District
of Columbia Code reference, see Winder, 566 F.3d at 213.
121. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006) (referring to "the power-
ful network of legislative enactments-such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor
codes-available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing"). See also Huppert v. City of
Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 710 (9th Cir. 2009); Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1150
n.14 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Garcetti).
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hit-or-miss quality.122 But this is not the most basic problem. The
less obvious and more crucial problem is that, as the argument above
illustrates, the hit-or-miss solutions of whistleblower and labor stat-
utes often do not appreciate the utterly fundamental challenges that
the many private and public employer retaliation cases pose to the
rule of law itself. Thus with the employer undermining the integrity
of the rule of law, the legal community needs to rethink the law of
private and public employer workplace retaliation, largely with an eye
toward better protecting plainly fundamental rule of law values.
122. See, e.g., Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 440-41 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing, e.g., D.
WESTMAN & N. MODESIrr, WHISTLEBLOWING: LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 67-75,
281-307 (2d ed. 2004)) (discussing a number of crucial limits and restrictions on the
scope of several such statutes). For some important limitations even of an ambitious
such federal statute, see Robert G. Vaughn, America's First Comprehensive Statute Pro-
tecting Corporate Whistleblowers, 57 ADmIN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2005). For a sense of some of
the gaps, incompleteness, and insufficiency of state-level whistleblower and related leg-
islation and adjudication, see Courtney J. Anderson DaCosta, Stitching Together the
Patchwork: Burlington Northern's Lessons For State Whistleblower Law, 96 GEo. L. J.
951, 952-58 (2008).
768 [Vol. 44
